"Overcoming Electoral Uncertainty: Strategic Incentives for Pre-Electoral Coalition Entry"
My dissertation explores the causes of pre-electoral coalitions (PEC). The project emphasizes the effects political institutions have on constraining political actors and increasing electoral uncertainty for both parties and voters. While most parties in parliamentary democracies often contest elections independently and negotiate government coalitions in the post-electoral arena, some parties negotiate pre-electoral agreements and enter into coalitions before contesting elections. Despite roughly one in five parties entering into PECs, the coalition literature has often overlooked the role of such strategic pre-electoral alliances and emphasized coalition bargaining in the post-electoral arena. What makes this void in the literature particularly relevant is the fact that parties who enter into PECs often influence the outcome of electoral competition and government entry. In light of these observations, my project asks the following question: In contrast to parties who “go it alone” and contest elections independently, why do some parties have incentives to enter into pre-electoral coalitions and negotiate coalition agreements prior to contesting elections? My research project explores the fundamental causes which lead political agents to consider PECs and contributes to an emerging literature on the dynamics of party interactions in the pre-electoral arena.
Parties weigh the costs and benefits of PECs in their decisionmaking calculus as they seek to maximize their expected utility of entering government, which is a function of their desire to maximize seat-, office, and policy-seeking interests while minimizing costs. As parties weigh their electoral options, this study argues that they must take into account the political institutions which constrain their electoral strategies and create uncertainty in the pre-electoral arena. Parties consider PEC entry when they deem doing so will increase their probability of winning seats and ultimately enter government. Committing to a PEC is a type of signaling mechanism which makes them more identifiable to the voters. PEC entry is conditional on the level of constraints that are imposed by political institutions in the pre-electoral arena. Specifically, the interaction of disproportional, multiparty systems and bicameral chambers increase electoral uncertainty for a set of political actors. Differences in electoral system type make electoral outcomes less predictable and create incentives for parties to consider PECs. In addition, bicameral chambers serve as additional veto players that parties must account for in their decisionmaking calculus. The interactive effect of these two types of institutions increase electoral uncertainty and make PEC entry a viable option.
To evaluate my argument, I utilize a mixed-method approach combining both quantitative and qualitative analysis. To achieve external validity, statistical methods are used to analyze time-series, cross-sectional data from twenty advanced democracies from 1946 to 2010. I find robust evidence that majoritarian and mixed electoral systems with bicameral chambers significantly influence the likelihood of observing pre-electoral coalitions. In light of the empirical findings, I use in-depth, case study analysis to test the extent of the theory’s internal validity.
Coalition Making in the Pre-Electoral Arena: The 1999 LDP-CGP Coalition
Why did the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Clean Government Party (CGP) enter into a pre-electoral coalition prior to the 2000 general election? The PEC between the LDP and CGP was a rational strategy brought about by the interaction of two institutional features: Japan’s shift towards a mixed electoral system and the realities of a divided government following the LDP’s defeat in the 1989 House of Councillors election. Both factors created three primary motivations for the parties to enter into a PEC: (1) electoral survival, (2) resolving divided government, and (3) access to government perks, specifically the ability to wield legislative influence. Changes to Japan’s political institutions forced parties to respond by adapting to the new political environment, and the culmination was the LDP-CGP PEC.
This paper examines the 1999 LDP-CGP PEC using a mixed-method approach. In addition to tracing the causal mechanisms of the PEC through a historical institutionalist account incorporating interviews with Diet members and party executives, this paper uses quantitative analysis to determine the effects of the LDP-CGP PEC on the 2000 election. The findings reveal that both parties were dependent on one another to win in the 2000 election, and the PEC was key for both parties to survive the electoral game. The findings also reveal the increasing dependence of both parties to win elections through a PEC due to the increasingly constraining pre-electoral environment which that define Japanese elections today.
Future Research
Future research consists of expanding data on PECs and understanding their effects on governance. First, the current literature has focused exclusively on Europe, advanced democracies, or individual cases in Latin America and South Asia. There has not been any attempt to explore the nexus of the causes and consequences of PECs across both developing and developed countries. I plan to expand my dataset to parliamentary democracies in developing countries to confirm whether my argument continues to hold. Furthermore, I plan to begin a new strand of PEC research which seeks to examine how PECs influence governance once parties enter government. Specifically, I am interested in examining the effects of PECs on government entry, the degree coalition agreements are implemented, and their effects on cabinet and ministerial stability.
My dissertation explores the causes of pre-electoral coalitions (PEC). The project emphasizes the effects political institutions have on constraining political actors and increasing electoral uncertainty for both parties and voters. While most parties in parliamentary democracies often contest elections independently and negotiate government coalitions in the post-electoral arena, some parties negotiate pre-electoral agreements and enter into coalitions before contesting elections. Despite roughly one in five parties entering into PECs, the coalition literature has often overlooked the role of such strategic pre-electoral alliances and emphasized coalition bargaining in the post-electoral arena. What makes this void in the literature particularly relevant is the fact that parties who enter into PECs often influence the outcome of electoral competition and government entry. In light of these observations, my project asks the following question: In contrast to parties who “go it alone” and contest elections independently, why do some parties have incentives to enter into pre-electoral coalitions and negotiate coalition agreements prior to contesting elections? My research project explores the fundamental causes which lead political agents to consider PECs and contributes to an emerging literature on the dynamics of party interactions in the pre-electoral arena.
Parties weigh the costs and benefits of PECs in their decisionmaking calculus as they seek to maximize their expected utility of entering government, which is a function of their desire to maximize seat-, office, and policy-seeking interests while minimizing costs. As parties weigh their electoral options, this study argues that they must take into account the political institutions which constrain their electoral strategies and create uncertainty in the pre-electoral arena. Parties consider PEC entry when they deem doing so will increase their probability of winning seats and ultimately enter government. Committing to a PEC is a type of signaling mechanism which makes them more identifiable to the voters. PEC entry is conditional on the level of constraints that are imposed by political institutions in the pre-electoral arena. Specifically, the interaction of disproportional, multiparty systems and bicameral chambers increase electoral uncertainty for a set of political actors. Differences in electoral system type make electoral outcomes less predictable and create incentives for parties to consider PECs. In addition, bicameral chambers serve as additional veto players that parties must account for in their decisionmaking calculus. The interactive effect of these two types of institutions increase electoral uncertainty and make PEC entry a viable option.
To evaluate my argument, I utilize a mixed-method approach combining both quantitative and qualitative analysis. To achieve external validity, statistical methods are used to analyze time-series, cross-sectional data from twenty advanced democracies from 1946 to 2010. I find robust evidence that majoritarian and mixed electoral systems with bicameral chambers significantly influence the likelihood of observing pre-electoral coalitions. In light of the empirical findings, I use in-depth, case study analysis to test the extent of the theory’s internal validity.
Coalition Making in the Pre-Electoral Arena: The 1999 LDP-CGP Coalition
Why did the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Clean Government Party (CGP) enter into a pre-electoral coalition prior to the 2000 general election? The PEC between the LDP and CGP was a rational strategy brought about by the interaction of two institutional features: Japan’s shift towards a mixed electoral system and the realities of a divided government following the LDP’s defeat in the 1989 House of Councillors election. Both factors created three primary motivations for the parties to enter into a PEC: (1) electoral survival, (2) resolving divided government, and (3) access to government perks, specifically the ability to wield legislative influence. Changes to Japan’s political institutions forced parties to respond by adapting to the new political environment, and the culmination was the LDP-CGP PEC.
This paper examines the 1999 LDP-CGP PEC using a mixed-method approach. In addition to tracing the causal mechanisms of the PEC through a historical institutionalist account incorporating interviews with Diet members and party executives, this paper uses quantitative analysis to determine the effects of the LDP-CGP PEC on the 2000 election. The findings reveal that both parties were dependent on one another to win in the 2000 election, and the PEC was key for both parties to survive the electoral game. The findings also reveal the increasing dependence of both parties to win elections through a PEC due to the increasingly constraining pre-electoral environment which that define Japanese elections today.
Future Research
Future research consists of expanding data on PECs and understanding their effects on governance. First, the current literature has focused exclusively on Europe, advanced democracies, or individual cases in Latin America and South Asia. There has not been any attempt to explore the nexus of the causes and consequences of PECs across both developing and developed countries. I plan to expand my dataset to parliamentary democracies in developing countries to confirm whether my argument continues to hold. Furthermore, I plan to begin a new strand of PEC research which seeks to examine how PECs influence governance once parties enter government. Specifically, I am interested in examining the effects of PECs on government entry, the degree coalition agreements are implemented, and their effects on cabinet and ministerial stability.